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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Plaintiff did not wave her constitutional rights or the children's to 
due process of law. Can a Court make an unbiased and unprejudiced 
decision without weighing the testimony when ordering a mother and 
children to move from their home against their rights. Under what law or 
authorization does the Court have this discretion? Plaintiff could find 
none. If given to Court as a privilege it is open to or invites abuse. 
II. The issue of judicial bias may not have been raised properly. The 
Plaintiff did not know how to raise the issue of judicial bias at the Trial 
Court level. Her attorney should have raised the issue instead of 
withdrawing. The Appellate Court should give consideration, under the 
circumstances, of what is in the record indicating that the Court had made 
a decision to move her from her home even before evidence was presented 
as shown in the extensive excerpts from the Trial Transcript below. 
III . There is ample evidence in the record to show unreasonableness of 
the property division. The issues were properly presented to the Court 
and tried on the evidence. The property distribution is unjust and clearly 
constitutes an abuse of discretion especially in view of the jointly held 
houses and other marital property of the parties. 
IV. Matters raised by Plaintiff are reviewable. When Plaintiff took her 
case, pro se, the Court did not give her an extension of time to study the 
Record and to prepare and file the proper papers and motions; which were 
her right and duty in acting pro se. The Trial Court did not inform the 
Plaintiff of rights to seek relief from the pressure being placed upon her 
by the Trial Court or her rights to seek a new trial or to appeal the decree. 
V. It is not clear from the record that the parties settled all issues. If 
the parties had stipulated and settled all disputed issues properly and 
fairly according to the laws of Utah there would have been no need for the 
Plaintiff to appeal the verdict. In chambers and off the record, Court did 
not merely confirm all agreements of the parties after finding it reasonable 
to do so, but arbitrarily reversed some over the objections of Plaintiff. 
VI. The evidence from the record shows that the Findings of Fact are 
clearly erroneous. Much of the evidence of material mistakes, material 
misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, and/or undue influence was off the 
record and can not be used by the Appeals Court according to the rules. 
But this does not mean that it did not happen and the Plaintiffs rights 
were violated. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by 
Mr. Richman, Attorney for Defendant, are not consistent with clauses in the 
Trial Brief or sufficient to support a fair judgment of the Court. 
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VII. It is not clear there was an agreement confirmed by the parties and 
the Court. A reviewing Court may set aside or modify a consent decree 
when adjudicated in the manner of instance case, with showing of fraud, 
undue influence, coercion, mistake of material fact, misrepresentation of a 
material fact or showing that consent was not given by Plaintiff. 
VIII. The findings of fact are not sufficient to support the judgment of 
the Court. The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by 
Defendant's attorney and handed to Plaintiff September 10th at 4:00 p.m. 
as she entered court. Plaintiff wasn't given the papers in advance to 
approve as the Court had asked. The Court may have assumed that they 
were correct and met with her approval. Many errors are shown below. 
IX. Plaintiff offers a theory below for review and relief on her claim 
against the "quick sale" of the house. A remedy or relief can be designed 
by the Appellate Court including a review of the action in light of U.S and 
Utah laws. She can find no precedence in similar cases; it seems unique. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAVE HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW, OR THOSE OF THE CHILDREN. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Section 1, 14th Amendment, and 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law]. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
It is elementary that there can be no judicial action affecting vested 
rights that is not based upon some process or notice whereby the 
interested parties are brought within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry v. Bonneville Irr. Dist.. 71 U. 
202, 263 P. 751 
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The Court issued an order and reaffirmed the order requiring plaintiff 
to vacate defendant's home on or before the 20th day of May, 1990. 
plaintiff ignored that court order. During an Order to Show Cause and 
Motion for Management and Scheduling Conference, the Court reaffirmed 
that the plaintiff should be removed from the home within ten (10^ davs. 
plaintiff ignored that order. [Emphasis added] (Record 179, par. 6). 
The short amount of time the Court gave the Plaintiff to move was 
unrealistic even if the Order was legal and Plaintiff had funds to move. 
The home was also the Plaintiffs home as a joint tenant, with full rights 
of survivorship, and not as tenants in common, (Brief of Appellant, A-30) 
The parties also own a rental home in West Valley (Bennion) as joint 
tenants. [Emphasis added] (Brief of Appellant, A-31). 
The Plaintiff is impecunious. She has no resources with which to pay 
the costs of moving and no present ability to provide substitute housing 
for the minor children of the parties. Plaintiff is 53 years of age and in 
fragile health (Record 148, par. 6). 
Plaintiff has made diligent inquiry in an effort to find adequate housing 
for herself and daughters without success. In this regard she has inquired 
as to public shelters and is informed that housing is available only for a 
short time basis (Record 148, par. 7). 
The unreasonable Order for the Plaintiff to move within 10 days 
included the minor children who clearly received no process or notice. 
Even though this matter may now be "moot and meaningless" it was 
clearly erroneous and should not be tolerated by the Court in future cases. 
II . THE ISSUE OF JUDICIAL BIAS MAY NOT HAVE BEEN 
RAISED PROPERLY. 
Plaintiff did not know how to raise the issue of judicial bias at the Trial 
Court level. Her attorney should have raised the issue instead of/or before 
withdrawing. The Appellate Court should give consideration (under the 
circumstances) of what is in the record indicating that the Court had made 
4 
decision to move her from her home even before evidence was presented: 
as shown in the extensive excerpts from the Trial Transcript below. 
The preconceived opinion or judgment of the Court leaning adverse to 
Plaintiffs reason for staying in her home until the divorce action was 
completed, or a suitable buyer was found, without just grounds or before 
sufficient knowledge, clearly indicates bias of mind and prejudice. 
Injury to Plaintiff due to the judgment of the Court in ordering her to 
move from her home, in disregard of her and the children's rights, caused 
the loss of many thousands of dollars return from the sale of the home, in 
addition to very much pain and suffering for her and the children. 
Trial Transcript excerpts: 
Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, July 11, 1990 (3:00 P.M.) 
The Court: Do you think we are going to finish this by five 
o'clock? [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Richman: Oh, sure. (Tr. p. 1, line 20 - 22). 
The Court: We can waste a lot of time objecting. 
Mr. Richman: Maybe I won't finish until five o'clock. (Tr. p. 2, 
line 23 - 25; p. 3, line 1). 
Q. (By Mr. Richman) Mr. Gum, when you were married to your 
first wife did you purchase a home? 
A. Yes, I did. (Tr. p. 3, line 24 - 25; p, 4, line 1). 
Q. And is that where the Plaintiff is residing at the time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was the house remodeled after you married this present wife, 
Rita Gum? 
A. Yes, it was. 
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Q. And whose money was used to remodel the house? 
A. My money. 
Q. Was it from your earnings at work? 
A. Earnings, my earnings. 
Q And savings? 
A. And savings. 
Q. And was there any money at any time provided to you by Rita 
Gum, the plaintiff in this action, to remodel or purchase or do anything 
toward the upkeep of this house? [Emphasis added]. 
A. None whatsoever. (Tr. p. 4, line 7 - 24). 
The Record will show some of Defendants answers were perjury; when 
he indicates that only his money was used to remodel the house. 
Q. And you have been married a total of about eight years? 
A. Approximately eight years. 
Q. During that time you had three divorce actions. Do you recall 
that at the last divorce action she was ordered to get out of the house? 
A. Yes she was. 
Q And she did not? 
A. She did not. (Tr. p. 5, lines 3 - 12). 
(If that Order was legitimate, why wasn't it enforced?) 
Q. Is the house for sale? 
A. The house is for sale. (Tr. p. 6, lines 23 - 24). 
The Court: Really, the only issue is whether she ought to 
vacate the premises. (Tr. p. 7, lines 23 - 24). 
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Q. (By Mr. Richman) Let me hand you what you has been 
marked as Defendant's exhibit 1-D. 
Mr. Spafford: The answer to the question, your Honor, is 
yes. That is the issue. 
Q. (By Mr. Richman) I ask if you can identify that? 
The Court: And I made an Order that she's to vacate by May 
20th. 
Mr. Richman: Yes. 
The Court: And she's not out? 
Mr. Richman: This is right? 
The Court: What is the issue? 
Mr. Richman: We want to show the house— 
The Court: I don't care what the house looks like. Why 
doesn't she get out? 
Mr. Spafford: That's right. 
The Court: That's the issue. And I'll tell you, if that's the 
Order, and if she isn't out, well, the Court will enforce it's Order. 
Mr. Spafford: Or listen to mitigation. 
The Court: The fact remains, if I entered the Order, and I 
will allow— the Order will be enforced unless there is some extenuating 
circumstances that precluded this individual from moving. 
Mr. Spafford: That's right. 
The Court: And I will tell you this, I'm not prejudging the 
case, but they have to be very substantial reasons why the house isn't 
vacated. 
Mr. Spafford: I think, your Honor, that sums up the case. 
The Court: Fine. Then since— 
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Mr. Richman: May I respond? 
The Court: Let me put it this way. I'm going to rule in your 
favor unless she can come up with something, and then I'll give you a 
chance to respond. Lets hear from her as to why she can't move off the 
premises, because your motion is well taken. 
Mr. Richman: So the Court knows where we stand. I'm 
probably finished with him as far as testimony. This is the good season, it 
is thought, to sell houses. 
The Court: Mr. Richman, let me tell you, you don't need to 
go any further. 
Mr. Richman: That's— okay. That's all I have with my 
client. 
The Court: Your motion is well taken unless she can 
convince me to the contrary, and then you can rebut. (Tr. p. 8, lines 3 - 25; 
p. 9 lines 1 - 25; p. 10, line 1). 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) I show you what has been marked for 
identification as Exhibit 9-P and ask you if you can identify what that 
instrument is. 
A. It's a Warranty Deed. 
Q Does that bear your signature? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. Does it pertain to the property that we referred to earlier 
today? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Mr. Spafford: No further questions. 
Mr. Spafford: I will offer exhibit 9. 
Mr. Richman: May I see that? May I see the deed? 
Mr. Spafford: May the witness step down, your Honor? 
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Mr. Richman: I object to this, your Honor. That has no 
relevance. It merely shows the status of title of the property. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Richman: What bearing does that have? 
The Court: Okay. Ill go ahead and admit it. All it is for 
purposes of showing title. (Tr. p. 10, lines 11 - 25; p. 11, lines 1 -7). 
(Mr. Richman spends a lot of time going into Plaintiffs deposition and 
the previous time in court; when Mr. Welker was Plaintiffs attorney) 
The Court: 111 go ahead and hear what her reasons are. Why 
haven't you moved out after I told you and the Order had been entered? 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) Let me put it this way. Where would you 
go if you moved out? 
A. I don't have anyplace to go. [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: That's immaterial. [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Spafford: It goes to the issue of contempt, your Honor. 
The Court: Let's find out why she doesn't move out, not 
where she's going to go. [Emphasis added]. 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) Why haven't you moved out? 
A. I don't have anyplace to go. I don't have any money to go 
anyplace. [Emphasis added] (Tr. p. 19, line 23 - 25; p. 20, line 1 - 13). 
The Court: Well where she goes is immaterial as far as I'm 
concerned. [Emphasis added]. 
Mr. Spafford: Let me make a proffer, your Honor, to save a 
lot of time. 
My proffer is that she earns less than $600 a month; he earns 
$3,000 month. This couple has two homes. The one is the exhibit 9-P, 
which is the home they're living in. It is owned jointly by them, and while 
admittedly it was acquired prior to the marriage, during the marriage from 
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marital assets the home was remodeled. Indeed it was conveyed to her 
jointly with him, so she's has an equitable interest in the property. 
They have a second piece of property in Salt Lake County, the 
lot 72, Whitewood Estates, another home which is also deeded to the two 
parties jointly, Mr. Gum has placed, under a rental agreement, his son in 
the second piece property, and he is collecting the rent on it. 
So effectively, your order dispossesses her of the home she's 
living in and effectively grants him the possession of both pieces of 
property, two homes. [Emphasis added]. 
So we have the ludicrous situation of a woman who earns a 
poverty level wage, who has no place to go. and who has a equity in two 
separate pieces of property: and the husband winds up with both pieces of 
property while she's effectively put out on the street. [Emphasis added] 
(Tr. p. 20, lines 19 -25; p.21, lines 1 -20) . 
Q. All right. Who lives in the house with you? 
A. My two— our two minor children. 
Q. Are those his children as well as yours? 
A. Yes they [are]. 
Q. So, they would be put out of the home also? 
A. They would be put out of the home also, sir. 
Mr. Spafford: That's all, your Honor. I submit it. 
The Court: Okay. Now— 
Mr. Richman: Well, your Honor, this is why I have a little 
difficulty with Mr. Spafford. That was far beyond a proffer. 
The Court: Let's go ahead. 
Mr. Richman: Let me finish. 
The Court: I can sort this all out. 
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Mr. Richman: I don't think so, because he said as if that is a 
factual matter. 
The Court: We're going to waste a lot of time here. I can 
sort this out. I told you in the first instance I'm inclined to have her move 
out of the house: They haven't shown me any reason why she shouldn't be 
out. So, I'm not convinced that the fact that she hasn't anv place to go is a 
reason that I should not enforce the Order. So, you know— [Emphasis 
added] (Tr. p. 24, line 21 - 25; p. 25, line 1 - 22). 
Mr. Richman: Let me proffer some facts that will assist the 
Court. 
The Court: That's what I'm trying to get-
Mr. Richman: There's a man in the back of the room that 
owns the house that he speaks of that is their house in West Valley. This 
man paid all the money for the down payment . He's here to testify. He 
has paid out the payments. The house was taken in their names. During 
their last divorce thev gave a Quit Claim Deed. [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Richman: That's a fact that is basic and it's contrary to 
what he represents to the Court. 
The Court: So therefore— 
Mr. Richman: Basic fact. 
The Court: Therefore today I only have the one house 
before me, one house. [Emphasis added] (Tr. p. 26, line 7 - 23). 
(Mr. Richman made his proffer to prove that the parties son, Jim, owns 
the second home in West Valley (Bennion) but the evidence clearly shows 
that Jim has never owned the other home) 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) Mrs. Gum, I show you what has been 
marked as Exhibit 11-P. Could you tell me what that document is? 
A. It's a Warranty Deed. 
Q To what property? 
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A. 3685 South 3650 West. 
Q. Is that the West Valley property? 
A. That is, sir. 
Q. That is the property not presently occupied by you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who is occupying that property? 
A. Mr. Gum and his son. 
Q. Who owns that property? 
A. Mr. Gum and myself. (Tr. p. 28, line 1 8 - 2 5 ; p. 29, 1 - 7). 
Mr. Spafford offers the Warranty Deed as Exhibit 11-P (CONVEY and 
WARRANT to JAMES R. GUM and RITA C. GUM, husband and wife, as joint 
tenants—) (Brief of Appellant, A-31). 
The Court: Now Mr. Richman, you say a Quit Claim has been 
executed between Mr. and Mrs. Gum to the son? 
Mr. Spafford: May I continue? 
The Court: Yes, you may. 
Q. (By Mr, Spafford) Mrs. Gum, have you ever knowingly 
conveyed away your interest in the West Valley home? 
A. No, sir, I haven't. 
Q. Now, some reference has been made to an earlier divorce 
between you and Mr. Gum. Was that divorce granted? 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. Was it dropped and withdrawn? 
12 
A. Yes. 
Q. During the course of that divorce-
A. He's the one that applied for that divorce, by the way. 
Q. During the period that that divorce was pending did you 
knowingly Quit Claim that property? 
A. No, sir. (Tr. p. 29, line 9 - 25; p. 30, line 1 - 4). 
Q. Now, Mr. Richman is going to question you about exhibit 12-D. 
That's a Quit Claim Deed. Does that refresh your memory at all? 
A. No, sir. That is not mine. 
Q. Is that your signature? 
A. No. sir. 
Mr. Richman: I didn't hear her answer. 
The Court: I couldn't hear it. 
The witness: It looks like mine, but I never signed it. I 
wouldn't do that. 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) Did you ever appear before a Notary 
Public? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. On that? 
A. No, sir. (Tr. p. 30, line 7 - 21) 
(Cross examination of parties son Jim) 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) You bought the house, but you bought it 
from your father and in your father's name? 
A. It was put in their name. 
Q. Why was it in their name when you bought it? 
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A. Personal reasons. 
Mr. Spafford: Nothing further. 
Mr. Richman: Nothing further. 
The Court: What were the personal reasons? 
The witness: Very bad credit [Emphasis added]. 
The Court: Anything further of this witness? 
Mr. Richman: Nothing further. 
Q. (By Mr. Spafford) Are you claiming the credit for interest 
on his tax return? 
A, They haven't been claimed by anybody. 
Mr. Spafford: I see. That's all, your Honor. 
The Court: Fine. You may step step down. Anything Further? 
Mr. Richman: Nothing further, your Honor. 
The Court: Do you have anything further? 
Mr. Spafford: Just Argument. 
The Court: Pardon? 
Mr. Spafford: Just argument. 
The Court: What am I to hear that I haven't already heard? 
(Tr. p. 39, 13 - 25; p. 40, 1 - 15 ). 
(Close examination of the Quit-Claim Deed shows the date: 28th day of 
August 1987. How could it have been given, as Mr. Richman proffered, 
"during their last divorce?" The last complaint was filed October 31, 1988) 
(Record 178). 
The Notary Public, Fay Anderson, failed to date the Quit-Claim Deed; it's 
not the legal title to the said property which the Warranty Deed clearly is) 
A properly executed Quitcaim Deed (which this one isn't) transfers only 
what interest parties may have had in the property at the time it was 
14 
executed, not the property title itself. Interest of the parties has changed 
considerably since 1987 as the Quit-Claim Deed was never acted upon. 
If the property is sold to Jim or another party a Deed to properly 
transfer the title will be required to claim capital gain or loss taxes. 
An amended federal tax should be filed by Defendant to obtain credit 
for interest and upkeep expenses and divide the returns with Plaintiff. 
Mr. Richman perpetrated a fraud upon the Court, claiming that the Quit-
Claim Deed was proof of ownership, which Court accepted as fact. The 
parties still hold the West Valley, (Bennion), rental home as joint tenants. 
The Trust Deed is still in force, as the matter was not resolved by the Trial 
Court; Plaintiff and Defendant are responsible that the payments are made 
and proper reporting on tax returns. This could cause serious problems) 
The Court: If you follow the rules of proper practice— and as I 
say again, Ifm not trying the attorneys here today, but Ifm going to Order 
that she vacate the house. That is going to be the Order. She will vacate it 
within ten days, and if she doesn't vacate within 10 days, then the Court 
will cite her for contempt. (Tr. p. 42, lines 4 - 10). 
(The Court ordered Plaintiff and the children to move; though the facts 
presented above prove that the parties were joint tenants of both homes) 
The Court: But she has ten days to get moved— But she's 
going to vacate, period. 
What is the next issue? (Tr. p. 42, lines 22 - 25; p. 43, lines 1 - 6). 
The Record of the trial shows additional substantive evidence of judicial 
bias. Much bias was also exercised by Court off Record in chambers. 
Plaintiff did not know how to handle judicial bias at the Trial Court 
level. Her attorney, Mr. Spafford, must have known how to handle it —and 
should have moved for a new trial; before his withdrawal as counsel. 
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If the issue of judicial bias was not preserved and raised properly for 
the Appellate Court, Plaintiffs attorney surely should have done it. 
III . THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SHOW 
UNREASONABLENESS OF THE PROPERTY DIVISION. 
During the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired investments 
which should be equitably divided. (Par. 8, Record 3). The issues were 
properly presented to Court and tried on the evidence. The property 
distribution is unjust and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion; especially 
in accord with Utah code regarding the jointly held houses. 
The West Valley house (Bennion) was one of those investments 
covered in Plaintiffs Verified Complaint. It was (and still is) a rental 
investment, rented to their son Jim under a verbal agreement; in which he 
may purchase the house if he ever become able, which he hasn't. 
Jim has not purchased the home and may never qualify for a loan 
unless he corrects his "very bad credit." 
A properly executed Quitclaim Deed transfers only what interest a 
party may have in the property; it is not a title to mortgaged property. 
Mortgage companies issue Warranty Deeds, which describe the interest. 
Quitclaim deeds do not imply the conveyance of any particular interest 
in the property. Grantee acquires only interest of his grantor, "be that 
interest what it may." Nix v. Tooele County. 101 Utah 84, 118 P.2d 376 
(1941). 
A written contract for the sale of real estate described, which stipulates 
that the vendor agrees to sell, subject to existing liens and restrictions of 
record; that the purchaser agrees to purchase; paying a specified sum; and 
that the vendor, on receipt of the price and mortgage securing a deferred 
payment, will deliver a quitclaim deed may not be varied by parole, to 
the effect that before the execution of the contract the purchaser was told 
that the only title the vendor could give was such as he had and no more, 
since whatever was said before the execution of the contract was merged 
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therein and became immaterial. Wallach v. Riverside Bank. 206 N.Y. 434, 
100 N.E. 50 (1912). 
The rental home in West Valley (Bennion) is held by the Plaintiff 
and Defendant as joint tenants. Subject to a Trust Deed in favor of Western 
Mortgage Loan Corporation dated September 4th, 1986 in the original 
principal amount of $69, 857.00 which Trust Deed the grantees herein 
assume and agree to pay. [Emphasis added] (Brief of Appellant, A -31). 
IV. MATTERS RAISED BY PLAINTIFF ARE REVIEWABLE. 
When Plaintiff took charge of her case, pro se, the Court did not give her 
an extension of time to study the record to prepare and file the proper 
papers and motions; which were her right and duty in acting pro se. 
At no time did the Trial Court inform the Plaintiff of her rights to seek 
relief from the pressure being placed upon her, by the Trial Court and 
Defendant, or of her right to seek a new trial; or to appeal the decree. 
The Trial Court did err in ruling on motions and issues, and the 
Appellate Court may review the deliberation and make appropriate 
disposition which could include setting aside or modifying the decree. 
If an Appellate Court were to vacate a consent decree that was not 
properly obtained in the Trial Court, it would be performing its proper 
task; seeing that the trial was fair and justice was served. 
If an Appellate Court finds that the Trial Court acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious fashion and did not allow the Plaintiff to present her case, 
pro se, according to Utah law, the Court should remand the case to the Trial 
Court for specific findings under strict standards in order for justice to be 
rendered to her and the children; as the laws of Utah justify. If this were 
not so, the positive efforts of the legal system to encourage justice would 
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be negated and to no avail and the respect for and the inviolability of the 
legal system would surely be in decline. 
V. IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE RECORD THAT THE PARTIES 
SETTLED ALL ISSUES. 
If the parties had stipulated and settled all disputed issues properly 
and fairly according to the laws of Utah there would have been no need for 
Plaintiff to appeal the verdict. In chambers and off the record, Court did 
not merely confirm all agreements of the parties after finding it was 
reasonable to do so; but arbitrarily reversed some. 
Plaintiff had presumed that Court would review the issues with 
reasonableness, but this was not the case. For example when the Plaintiff 
questioned Court about her husband's retirement benefits, Court turned to 
Mr. Richman and asked, "What about the retirement benefits". Mr. 
Richman replied, "She doesn't get any". Court then answered Plaintiff, "You 
don't get any." This was undue influence and was Mr. Richman also 
making decisions and judgments in the case? Of course this conversation is 
not in the Record, but the Trial Brief which Mr. Richman prepared is. 
The defendant is willing to divide equally any retirement earned 
during the parties' marriage or accruing during the parties' marriage. 
(Record 181, par. 3). 
This issue could be fairly and properly addressed with a new trial. 
VI. THE EVIDENCE FROM THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
There was extensive discussion between the Court the Plaintiff and 
Defendant's counsel in the Court's chamber on September 6th, and also 
September 10th when Defendant was then present. 
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Much of the evidence of material mistakes, material misrepresentation, 
fraud, coercion, and/or undue influence was off the record and can not be 
used by the Appeals Court according to the rules. But this does not mean 
that it did not happen or that Plaintiffs nghts were not violated. 
Plaintiff was told, in chambers, what she was to get whether she 
agreed to it or not. She was told what she would agreed to, as stipulation, 
when no agreement was reached. She saw that she wasn't going to get a 
fair trial and decided that her only recourse was to appeal. She didn't 
know at the time that she could ask for a new trial. 
The Court did not inform her of options for a new trial —or of appealing, 
either in chamber or open court. So she lost the opportunity for a new 
trial within the time period required; therefore being forced to appeal. 
The Plaintiff: Is there any waiting period? 
The Court: There is no waiting period. This winds it up. It's 
concluded. When I sign the documents, it's concluded. [Emphasis added] 
(Tr. p. 61, line 25; p. 62, line 1 - 4). 
The Court: That is suffice. Pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties the divorce will be granted, a mutual divorce will be granted, 
which will become final upon entry. [Emphasis added] (Tr. p. 64, line 20 -
23). 
Plaintiff thought that could be it —but, she still believed that she could 
appeal to get justice for the children and herself. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, prepared by Mr. 
Richman, we find evidence of material mistakes, and even coercion. 
(Record 189 and Brief of Appellant, A-ll to A-21): 
—Plaintiff appearing in person pro se, her previous attorney having 
withdrawn effective the 30th day of July, 1990; Notice to Appoint 
Successor Counsel having been made on the 31th day of July, 1990; — 
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This is true, but, was her counsel not coerced into withdrawing? 
—and certain agreements were made and stipulated into the record 
pertaining to all issues in the action— 
This statement is distorted, all issues were not stipulated or agreed to 
by the Plaintiff and Defendant. Many were and are still unresolved. 
Fact #5 is distorted from the truth. The mortgage of the home located 
at 655 H Street was taken by the parties as joint tenants to pay off the old 
mortgage and do the remodeling; two additional loans were required to 
complete the job. This paragraph is worded in a manner to make it appear 
that this property remained premarital property of Defendant and that 
premarital savings paid for the remodeling; and was his to keep. 
The net equity of the home (as joint tenants) was $12,574.75 including 
the check in Brief of Appellant, A-46; which was not reported to the Trial 
Court for division between the parties. Fact #5, by including home with 
premarital property as though it still was, is material misrepresentation. 
Nothing was said in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or the 
Trial Brief, (prepared by Mr. Richman), about the property held by the 
parties as joint tenants in West Valley City (Bennion); was this fraud or a 
material mistake? (Brief of Appellant, A-31). 
Plaintiff told Court she did not agree to Fact #14, Mr. Richman told 
Court that she had agreed to $3,000.00. Court told her that "$3,000.00 is 
all that you're going get. Provided those items are returned on or before 
the 10th to him, [Defendant]." This proved to be an impossible situation; 
for Plaintiff had sold items to obtain funds to move from their home. She 
was not able to get these items back. She did return the Llardro. 
She told Court, on the 10th of September, that she was unable to get the 
items back. This made no difference to Court, she would have to return the 
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items if she wanted to get her money. Mr. Richman said, "that's O.K., well 
take it out of the child support money." This was coercion and undue 
influence; not in the Record. Defendant gave her the $3,000.00 anyway 
VII. IT IS NOT CLEAR THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT CONFIRMED 
BY THE PARTIES AND ,HE COURT. 
If Plaintiff was coerced into an agreement there was no consent for the 
Court to confirm. Klein v. Klein is then not applicable. 
As in. Klein v. Klein 544 P.2D 472, 475 (Utah 1975), the appellant did 
not answer audibly before the Court on the record that she accepted the 
stipulation of the parties and understood the same. 
The Court: Well, you let me know if you can't get it. But 
other than that, do you concur in everything else that has transpired here 
since 1:30? [Emphasis added]. 
You have to answer audibly, yes or no. 
The Plaintiff: Yes. 
The Court: If you will prepare the Order beforehand. (Tr. p. 
62, line 1 3 - 1 9 ) 
Plaintiff, acting pro se, was confused by "do you concur" (she hates to 
admit it) but at the time, she didn't know the meaning of concur. One 
Webster definition; to come or flow together esp. with force or violence, 
may have fit her situation. The Court had given her conditions she could 
not comply with, only instructing her, "You have to answer audibly, yes or 
no." After answering, yes, Plaintiff was confused as to what Order was to 
be prepared beforehand. It may appear from the Record that she agreed 
with everything else that had transpired there since 1:30, but she hadn't. 
It is not clear there was an agreement confirmed by the parties and the 
Court; there are still many unresolved issues that need to be settled. 
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VIII . THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT. 
The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, prepared by Defendant's 
attorney, were handed to Plaintiff along with Decree of Divorce on 
September 10th at 4:00 p.m. as she entered court. 
The Court: If you give them to her in advance, then if she 
doesn't.t answer then I will assume that they're correct and meets her 
approval. (Tr. p. 68, line 4 - 6). 
Plaintiff wasn't given the papers in advance to approve as Court had 
asked. She tried a number of times to get the papers, but to no avail, (Mr. 
Richman's secretary said they were not ready). Court may have assumed 
they were correct and met with her approval. There were many errors. 
Plaintiff did not affirm and approve the specific findings of fact which 
are said to have recited the parties' agreement before Court on the 10th 
day of September, 1990, the date of entry of decree. She only recalls 
reading The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after returning home. 
Plaintiff did specifically assign an error to the award of alimony. In the 
Brief of Appellant, p.37, III, Fact #5 is a clerical error. It should be #15. 
Should the Appellate Court desire to look at the substance of the 
matters bearing on alimony considerations, there is ample evidence in the 
letter of Dr. Thomas B. Keith: (Brief of Appellant, A-34) 
—Mrs. Gum has chest pain, which is probably due to mitral valve 
prolapse, which is present by physical examination and on 
echocardiogram.- The chest pain, although it is not likely to be due 
to coronary artery disease, is none the less quite limiting in terms of 
her activities. 
In addition to her mitral valve prolapse, the patient has diabetes 
melitus, which is treated by Dr. Robert Maddock. 
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Plaintiff overextended herself working on two jobs at the same time to 
support herself and children, losing both jobs. She received assistance 
from H.E.A.T. on her utilities and gets food stamps. She may need public 
assistance to enter suitable employment. She has never worked as a 
secretary. But she welcomes the opportunity to become self sufficient. 
IX. PLAINTIFF OFFERS A THEORY FOR REVIEW AND RELIEF ON 
HER CLAIM AGAINST THE "QUICK SALE" OF THE HOUSE. THE 
MATTER IS REVIEWABLE. 
Plaintiffs claim that Court erred in ordering a quick sale of the parties' 
home on H Street is not "moot and meaningless". A remedy or relief can be 
designed by the Appellate Court including a review of the action in light of 
U.S and Utah laws. Was there any legal basis for the action? 
Plaintiff offers a theory to the reviewing court for correction of the 
matter as both homes of the parties were held in joint tenancy. 
In the Arizona case of Nesmith v. Nesmith 540 P.2d 1229, 112 Ariz. 248 
(Ariz. 1975) is stated: 
Joint tenancy property is to be divided equally by Trial Court in divorce, 
A.R.S. § 25-318. Title 30 Chapter 3, Section 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Brief of Appellant, par.6, p.43). 
Net equity after selling costs was $12,574.75 including a $2,345.75 
check (Brief of Appellant, A-46). This amount should be divided equally 
according to Utah law with each party receiving $6,273.87. This could help 
Plaintiff develop employment skills to support herself and the children. 
Had there been time to sell the home at its appraised value each party 
could have received $45,000.00; alimony would not have been needed. 
In Plaintiffs previous action, Answer to Amended Complaint and 
Verified Counterclaim, October 26, 1988: 
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It is reasonable that the defendant be awarded a sum of not less than 
$400.00 per month for a period of two (2) years as alimony from Plaintiff. 
During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home located 
at 5685 South 3650 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. It is fair and reasonable 
that Plaintiff be awarded exclusive use and possession of the home and 
real property and that the defendant receive an equitable lien in said 
property in the amount of one-half (1/2) of the equity. 
These provisions were offered because Plaintiff did not know what her 
rightful interests were in the homes. Defendant would have gotten the H 
Street home having three times the value of the West Valley home. 
With all the pressure being put on her by Defendant and Court to move 
quickly, in an Affidavit of Plaintiff, she made a counter offer: 
As an alternative, plaintiff is willing to convey her interest in said home 
and to vacate the same in exchange for payment of the sum of $3,000.00 
which represents a diminished part of one-half of the projected equity of 
said property and which fund would provide her a means of finding 
temporary suitable housing for herself and children (Record 148, par. 10.). 
A counter offer of $3,000.00 by Mr. Richman, which was not approved 
by either Defendant or Plaintiff was construed by the Court, in chambers, 
as being the total settlement. (Brief of Appellant, A-48). 
Conditions have changed. The West Valley Trust Deed is still in force, 
the matter was not resolved by the Trial Court and still needs to be 
resolved; Plaintiff and Defendant are still responsible that the payments 
are made and that the tax matters are reported properly to the I.R.S. 
There are a number of ways this matter could be resolved. One being, 
that Plaintiff and Defendant would each pay one half of the mortgage. 
Plaintiff and the children would be allowed to live in the home during the 
minority of the children; at the end of that time the home could be sold, 
dividing any net equity equally between the parties according to Utah law. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the record that there has been a miscarriage of justice in 
the instance case. Plaintiffs and children's rights were clearly violated. 
Constitutions were created to guarantee certain rights to citizens and 
laws are created so that these rights may be administrated with justice. 
Laws and rules of proper practice are created and amended so that 
justice may be properly rendered. Not following the laws and rules result 
in error and bad law. Bad law leads to misunderstanding and chaos. 
Courts were not intended as an arena where lawyers battle and bend 
the law to win for their clients; taking unfair advantage of their opposition 
or worse yet, working fraud upon the Court. 
Courts were created so that facts may be properly presented; resulting 
in fair decisions, insuring justice is served; not that the "best lawyer" wins. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests the Appellate Court to consider the record 
and conclusions in this case and the relief sought in this appeal. 
There were just far to many issues unresolved by the Trial Court. 
If Appellate Court finds that it can not resolve this case with justice to 
all parties, including the children —then the Court should remand the case 
to the Trial Court; in order that it may be properly and fairly retried. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 1991. 
Rita C. Gum 
In propria persona 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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